# Data Handling, File I/O, Privacy & Encryption Audit

**Audit Date:** 2026-04-28  
**Codebase:** scorpiox/clang  
**Scope:** 222 source files (124,371 LOC), excluding vendor libraries  
**Auditor:** Security Audit Agent  

---

## Executive Summary

The scorpiox codebase has a **broad data handling footprint** spanning configuration management, conversation persistence, multi-provider API credential handling, email services with TLS/DKIM, traffic capture, and session logging. **Three critical findings** were identified: (1) hardcoded API keys compiled into the WASM binary, (2) unsalted SHA-256 password hashing for email authentication, and (3) predictable temporary file paths creating symlink attack surfaces. The codebase demonstrates good practices in some areas (TLS via mbedTLS, redacted API key logging, session data isolation) but has significant gaps in credential management and temporary file security.

**Overall Risk Rating: HIGH**

---

## 1. Data Flow Summary

```
┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│                        DATA FLOW DIAGRAM                             │
├──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│                                                                      │
│  User Input ──► sx.c (TUI) ──► Provider (API) ──► AI Response       │
│       │              │              │                    │            │
│       ▼              ▼              ▼                    ▼            │
│  Bash exec      Conversation   HTTP Request         Display          │
│  (sx_exec)      .json save     (credentials)       (sxui_*)         │
│       │              │              │                    │            │
│       ▼              ▼              ▼                    ▼            │
│  /tmp files     .scorpiox/     Traffic capture     Session log       │
│                 sessions/      .scorpiox/traffics/  events.jsonl     │
│                                                                      │
│  Config cascade:                                                     │
│  defaults → exe_dir/scorpiox-env.txt → ~/.claude/scorpiox-env.txt   │
│           → CWD/.scorpiox/scorpiox-env.txt                          │
│                                                                      │
│  Email subsystem:                                                    │
│  SMTP/IMAP ──► sxmail_auth (SHA256) ──► maildir storage            │
│            ──► TLS (mbedTLS)        ──► DKIM (RSA-SHA256)          │
└──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
```

---

## 2. File I/O Inventory

### 2.1 Configuration Files

| File Path | Operation | Module | Purpose | Sensitivity |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| `exe_dir/scorpiox-env.txt` | Read | sx_config.c | Global configuration | **HIGH** — contains API keys, SSH passwords |
| `~/.claude/scorpiox-env.txt` | Read | sx_config.c | User-level config override | **HIGH** — contains API keys |
| `.scorpiox/scorpiox-env.txt` | Read/Write | sx_config.c | Project-level config | **HIGH** — contains API keys |
| `accounts.txt` (email) | Read | sxmail_auth.c | User:hash credential pairs | **HIGH** — password hashes |
| `filter.txt` (email) | Read | sxmail_filter.c | Email routing rules | LOW |

### 2.2 Session & Conversation Storage

| File Path | Operation | Module | Purpose | Sensitivity |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| `.scorpiox/sessions/<id>/conversation.json` | Read/Write | sx_conversation.c | Full conversation history | **HIGH** — user messages, tool inputs/outputs |
| `.scorpiox/sessions/<id>/session.log` | Append | sx_log.c | Debug/info/error log | MEDIUM — may contain keys at DEBUG level |
| `.scorpiox/sessions/<id>/events.jsonl` | Append | sx_session.c | Structured event stream | MEDIUM |
| `.scorpiox/sessions/<id>/trace.jsonl` | Append | sx_trace.c | Data flow trace with tool inputs | **HIGH** — tool_input includes bash commands |
| `.scorpiox/sessions/<id>/config-snapshot.txt` | Write | sx_session.c | Frozen config at session start | **HIGH** — full config dump |
| `.scorpiox/sessions/<id>/meta.json` | Write | sx_session.c | Session metadata & summary | LOW |
| `.scorpiox/sessions/<id>/traffic/` | Write | scorpiox-traffic.c | MITM traffic capture | **CRITICAL** — full HTTP request/response bodies |
| `.scorpiox/conversations/<id>.json` | Read/Write | sx_conversation.c | Legacy conversation format | **HIGH** |

### 2.3 Temporary Files

| File Path | Operation | Module | Purpose | Security |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| `/tmp/sxmux/sxmux-<name>.sock` | Create | sxmux_session.c | Unix domain socket | Dir created with 0700 ✓ |
| `/tmp/sxmux/sxmux-<name>.pid` | Read/Write | sxmux_session.c | Session PID tracking | Predictable name ⚠ |
| `/tmp/sx_emit_<id>_<seq>.txt` | Write | sx.c | Event emission temp file | Predictable name ⚠ |
| `/tmp/sx_voice.wav` | Write | scorpiox-voice.c | Voice recording | **Fixed path — race condition** ⚠ |
| `/tmp/sx_voice_result.txt` | Read/Write | scorpiox-voice.c | Voice transcription result | **Fixed path — race condition** ⚠ |
| `/tmp/sx_voice_<ts>.ogg` | Write | scorpiox-whatsapp.c | WhatsApp voice msg | Predictable (timestamp) ⚠ |
| `/tmp/sx_post_<pid>_<ts>.txt` | Write | scorpiox-server.c | HTTP POST body temp | Predictable ⚠ |
| `/tmp/sx_mcp_<pid>.json` | Write | sx_mcp.c | MCP config temp | Predictable ⚠ |
| `/tmp/sx_slirp_<pid>.sock` | Create | scorpiox-unshare.c | Slirp4netns socket | Predictable ⚠ |
| `/tmp/sx_builtin_<name>.sh` | Write | sx_slashcmd.c | Built-in command script | Predictable ⚠ |
| `/tmp/vault-XXXXXX` | Create | scorpiox-vault-git.c | Backup temp dir | **Uses mkdtemp()** ✓ |
| `<tmpdir>/sx-edit-<pid>.txt` | Write | sx.c | Editor temp file | Uses TMPDIR, PID-based |

### 2.4 Email Subsystem Files

| File Path | Operation | Module | Purpose | Sensitivity |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Maildir `tmp/` subdirectory | Write→Rename | sxmail_maildir.c | Atomic mail delivery | Contains email content |
| Maildir `new/` subdirectory | Read/Rename | sxmail_maildir.c | New message storage | Contains email content |
| Maildir `cur/` subdirectory | Read | sxmail_maildir.c | Read message storage | Contains email content |
| `~/.scorpiox/server-email.log` | Append | scorpiox-server-email.c | Email server log | MEDIUM |
| TLS cert file | Read | sxmail_tls.c | Server certificate | **HIGH** |
| TLS key file | Read | sxmail_tls.c | Private key | **CRITICAL** |
| DKIM key file | Read | sxmail_dkim.c | DKIM signing key | **CRITICAL** |

### 2.5 Logging Destinations

| File Path | Operation | Module | Purpose |
|---|---|---|---|
| `.scorpiox/logs/scorpiox-tmux.log` | Append | scorpiox-tmux.c | Tmux manager log |
| `.scorpiox/traffics/<id>/proxy.log` | Write | scorpiox-traffic.c | MITM proxy log |
| `.scorpiox/traffics/<id>/traffic.log` | Write | scorpiox-traffic.c | Traffic capture log |
| `/var/log/scorpiox-dns/` | Write | scorpiox-dns.c | DNS audit log |

---

## 3. PII Assessment

### 3.1 PII Data Handled

| PII Type | Location | Context | Risk |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Email addresses** | sxmail_smtp.c, sxmail_imap.c | SMTP MAIL FROM/RCPT TO, IMAP mailbox | Stored in mail queue, logged in server |
| **Email content** | sxmail_maildir.c, sxmail_queue.c | Full message bodies | Stored on disk in plaintext |
| **User credentials** | sxmail_auth.c | Username + SHA256 hash | Stored in accounts file |
| **Conversation content** | sx_conversation.c | All user messages and AI responses | Stored in JSON on disk |
| **Bash command output** | sx_conversation.c, sx_trace.c | Tool results stored as conversation messages | May contain arbitrary file contents, env vars |
| **JWT claims** | scorpiox-server.c | user_id, email from JWT | Logged at INFO level |
| **Username** | scorpiox-usage.c, scorpiox-unshare.c | `USER`, `USERNAME` env vars | Used for container setup |

### 3.2 PII Logging Risks

- **scorpiox-agent.c:817** — Logs environment variable key=value pairs at INFO level: `SX_INFO("  [VAR] %s=%s", key, value)`. If sensitive variables (API keys, tokens) are set, they will appear in logs.
- **scorpiox-server.c:502** — Logs authenticated user_id and email from JWT claims at INFO level.
- **config-snapshot.txt** — Written at session start, contains full config dump including API keys.

---

## 4. Credential Management

### 4.1 Credential Types & Storage

| Credential | Storage Method | Risk Level |
|---|---|---|
| `ANTHROPIC_API_KEY` | Config file (scorpiox-env.txt) / env var | MEDIUM — plaintext in file |
| `ANTHROPIC_ANTIGRAVITY_KEY` | **Hardcoded in sx_config_embedded.c** | **CRITICAL** — `sk-6088a10dc3c1473cac567069b0e557f6` |
| `ANTHROPIC_ZAI_KEY` | **Hardcoded in sx_config_embedded.c** | **CRITICAL** — `9c6fba5db3f84613aaf8700b05990835.ue19jY48d9GmddqX` |
| `GEMINI_API_KEY` | **Hardcoded in sx_config_embedded.c** | **CRITICAL** — `AIzaSyDsvlLnCdMFXnlCLxurMaAO5RKI8IQHVA8` |
| `OPENAI_API_KEY` | Config file / env var | MEDIUM — plaintext in file |
| `CLAUDE_CODE_SSH_PASS` | **Hardcoded in sx_config_embedded.c** | **CRITICAL** — `xboxone` |
| `CODEX_SSH_PASS` | Config file | MEDIUM — plaintext in file |
| `SMTP_PASS` | Config file | MEDIUM — plaintext in file |
| `SERVER_JWT_SECRET` | Config file / env var | **HIGH** — HMAC signing key |
| `HTTP_RELAY_KEY` | Config file / env var | MEDIUM |
| `TCP_API_KEY` | Config file | MEDIUM |
| TLS private key | File on disk (path in config) | **HIGH** — must be file-permission protected |
| DKIM private key | File on disk (path in config) | **HIGH** — must be file-permission protected |
| Git PAT tokens | Injected into URLs at runtime | **HIGH** — appear in `https://PAT@host/` URLs |

### 4.2 Critical Finding: Hardcoded Secrets in WASM Binary

**File:** `libsxutil/sx_config_embedded.c` (auto-generated, compiled into WASM)

```c
{"ANTHROPIC_ANTIGRAVITY_KEY", "sk-6088a10dc3c1473cac567069b0e557f6"},
{"ANTHROPIC_ZAI_KEY", "9c6fba5db3f84613aaf8700b05990835.ue19jY48d9GmddqX"},
{"GEMINI_API_KEY", "AIzaSyDsvlLnCdMFXnlCLxurMaAO5RKI8IQHVA8"},
{"CLAUDE_CODE_SSH_PASS", "xboxone"},
```

These secrets are baked into the compiled binary and can be trivially extracted. The WASM binary is distributed to end users, making this a **secret exposure vulnerability**.

### 4.3 Credential Logging Practices

**Good:** API keys are redacted in log output:
- `sx_provider_openai.c:452` — Logs `key=(set)` or `key=(none)` instead of actual value
- `sx_provider_openai_wasm.c:659` — Logs `key=***` instead of actual value
- `sx_provider_anthropic.c:127` — Logs `key=***` for API key presence

**Bad:** 
- `scorpiox-agent.c:817` — `SX_INFO("  [VAR] %s=%s", key, value)` logs all environment variables including potentially sensitive ones without filtering
- `sx_config.c:640` — `SX_INFO("config: wrote %s=%s to %s", key, value, path)` logs config writes including API key values

### 4.4 Credential Flow

```
scorpiox-env.txt ──► sx_config_init() ──► in-memory g_cfg struct
     │                                        │
     ▼                                        ▼
Environment vars ──► getenv() ──────────► Provider data->api_key[256]
                                              │
                                              ▼
                                         setenv() before exec
                                         (child process inherits)
                                              │
                                              ▼
                                         HTTP headers:
                                         "x-api-key: <key>"
                                         "Authorization: Bearer <key>"
```

---

## 5. Encryption Usage

### 5.1 Cryptographic Operations

| Algorithm | Library | Module | Purpose | Assessment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **TLS 1.2/1.3** | mbedTLS | sxmail_tls.c | Email transport encryption | ✓ Proper implementation |
| **RSA-SHA256** | mbedTLS | sxmail_dkim.c | DKIM email signing | ✓ RFC 6376 compliant |
| **SHA-256** | mbedTLS | sxmail_auth.c | Password hashing | **⚠ UNSALTED — weak** |
| **HMAC-SHA256** | Custom (scorpiox-server.c) | JWT verification | ✓ Standard JWT validation |
| **SHA-256** | Custom (scorpiox-server.c:149) | JWT HMAC component | ✓ RFC 6234 |
| **CTR-DRBG** | mbedTLS | sxmail_tls.c, sxmail_dkim.c | Cryptographic RNG | ✓ Proper seeding from entropy |
| **Base64** | mbedTLS + custom | sxmail_dkim.c, sxmail_auth.c | Encoding (not encryption) | N/A |

### 5.2 Critical Finding: Unsalted SHA-256 Password Hashing

**File:** `sxmail_auth.c:121-130`

```c
int sxmail_auth_hash_password(const char *pass, char *out, size_t out_sz) {
    if (!pass || !out || out_sz < 65) return -1;
    unsigned char digest[32];
    mbedtls_sha256((const unsigned char *)pass, strlen(pass), digest, 0);
    for (int i = 0; i < 32; i++)
        snprintf(out + i * 2, 3, "%02x", digest[i]);
    out[64] = '\0';
    return 0;
}
```

**Issues:**
1. **No salt** — identical passwords produce identical hashes, enabling rainbow table attacks
2. **No iteration/stretching** — single SHA-256 pass, trivially brute-forced (~billions/sec on GPU)
3. **Should use** bcrypt, scrypt, or Argon2id with per-user salt and adequate work factor

### 5.3 TLS Configuration

The TLS implementation in `sxmail_tls.c` uses mbedTLS correctly:
- Proper entropy seeding via `mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed()`
- Certificate chain loading via `mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_file()`
- Private key loading via `mbedtls_pk_parse_keyfile()`
- SSL session cache enabled
- Custom BIO callbacks for non-blocking I/O with handshake timeout protection

### 5.4 Data at Rest Encryption

**No data at rest encryption is implemented.** All persistent data is stored in plaintext:
- Conversation JSON files
- Session logs
- Config files with API keys
- Email messages in maildir
- Traffic captures (full HTTP bodies)

---

## 6. Temporary File Security

### 6.1 Findings

| Pattern | Count | Security |
|---|---|---|
| `mkdtemp()` | 1 (scorpiox-vault-git.c) | ✓ Secure |
| `mkstemp()` | 0 | — Not used anywhere |
| Predictable `/tmp/sx_*` paths | 8+ locations | **⚠ Insecure** |
| Fixed `/tmp/sx_voice.wav` | 1 | **⚠ Race condition / symlink attack** |

### 6.2 Specific Vulnerabilities

**Symlink attack vectors:**
- `/tmp/sx_voice.wav` and `/tmp/sx_voice_result.txt` — Fixed paths, no O_EXCL, no ownership check
- `/tmp/sx_post_<pid>_<ts>.txt` — Predictable (PID + timestamp), could be pre-created as symlink
- `/tmp/sx_mcp_<pid>.json` — PID-predictable
- `/tmp/sx_builtin_<name>.sh` — Name-predictable **and executed as shell script**

**Positive:**
- `/tmp/sxmux/` directory created with `mkdir(..., 0700)` — restricts access to owner
- `scorpiox-vault-git.c` properly uses `mkdtemp()` for temp directory

### 6.3 Temp File Cleanup

- `sx.c:707` — `remove(tmpfile)` after editor use ✓
- `sxmail_maildir.c` — Cleans up failed deliveries with `remove()`/`unlink()` ✓
- `sxmux_session.c` — Cleans up stale sockets and PID files ✓
- **Voice files**: No cleanup observed for `/tmp/sx_voice.wav` ⚠
- **Server POST files**: No cleanup observed for `/tmp/sx_post_*` ⚠

---

## 7. Logging Analysis

### 7.1 Logging Infrastructure

- **Framework:** Custom `sx_log.c` with 5 levels: ERROR, WARN, INFO, DEBUG, TRACE
- **Output:** Configurable file (`sx_log_set_file()`) or stderr
- **Timestamps:** Millisecond precision `[HH:MM:SS.mmm]`
- **Source location:** Included for DEBUG/TRACE (file:line)
- **Volume:** 1,342+ log statements across the codebase

### 7.2 Sensitive Data in Logs

| Risk | Location | Detail |
|---|---|---|
| **HIGH** | scorpiox-agent.c:817 | `SX_INFO("  [VAR] %s=%s", key, value)` — logs ALL env vars unfiltered |
| **HIGH** | sx_config.c:640 | `SX_INFO("config: wrote %s=%s ...")` — logs config writes including API keys |
| **MEDIUM** | sx_provider_openai.c:426 | `SX_DEBUG("openai: found OPENAI_API_KEY len=%zu", strlen(v))` — leaks key length |
| **MEDIUM** | sx_session.c config-snapshot | Full config dump at session start may include secrets |
| **LOW** | sx_provider_*.c | API key presence logged as `***` or `(set)` — properly redacted |
| **LOW** | sxmail_dkim.c:324 | Logs key file path (not key contents) |

### 7.3 Log File Locations

| Log | Path | Contains |
|---|---|---|
| Session log | `.scorpiox/sessions/<id>/session.log` | All SX_LOG output for session |
| Events log | `.scorpiox/sessions/<id>/events.jsonl` | Structured events |
| Trace log | `.scorpiox/sessions/<id>/trace.jsonl` | Tool inputs, data flow |
| Email log | `~/.scorpiox/server-email.log` | SMTP/IMAP operations |
| Tmux log | `.scorpiox/logs/scorpiox-tmux.log` | Session manager operations |
| Traffic log | `.scorpiox/traffics/<id>/traffic.log` | Full HTTP capture |
| DNS audit | `/var/log/scorpiox-dns/` | DNS query log |

---

## 8. Data Retention

### 8.1 Persistence Model

| Data Type | Location | Retention | Encryption |
|---|---|---|---|
| Conversations | `.scorpiox/sessions/<id>/conversation.json` | Indefinite | **None** |
| Session logs | `.scorpiox/sessions/<id>/session.log` | Indefinite | **None** |
| Traffic captures | `.scorpiox/traffics/<id>/` | Until `--clear` | **None** |
| Email messages | Maildir hierarchy | Indefinite | **None** |
| Config snapshots | `.scorpiox/sessions/<id>/config-snapshot.txt` | Indefinite | **None** |
| DNS audit logs | `/var/log/scorpiox-dns/` | Indefinite | **None** |

### 8.2 Observations

- `SESSION_RETENTION_DAYS` config key exists (default: 7) but **no automatic cleanup code** was found that enforces it
- `.scorpiox/sessions/` is automatically added to `.gitignore` ✓
- No data minimization — full conversation history, tool inputs/outputs, and trace data are retained
- Traffic capture (`scorpiox-traffic.c`) can be manually cleared via `--clear` flag which runs `rm -rf .scorpiox/traffics`

---

## 9. Environment Variable Usage

### 9.1 Sensitive Environment Variables (133 getenv() calls)

| Variable | Module | Sensitivity | Purpose |
|---|---|---|---|
| `OPENAI_API_KEY` | sx_provider_openai.c | **HIGH** | OpenAI API authentication |
| `GEMINI_API_KEY` | sx_provider_gemini.c | **HIGH** | Google Gemini API authentication |
| `AGENTS_PAT` | scorpiox-agent.c | **HIGH** | Git Personal Access Token |
| `SCORPIOX_HOME` | Multiple | MEDIUM | Installation directory |
| `HOME` / `USERPROFILE` | Multiple (19 calls) | LOW | User home directory |
| `EDITOR` / `VISUAL` | sx.c | LOW | Text editor preference |
| `SHELL` | sxmux_pane.c, sx_pty.c | LOW | Default shell |
| `USER` / `USERNAME` | scorpiox-usage.c | LOW | Current username |
| `CURL_CA_BUNDLE` | sx_platform.c | LOW | CA certificate path |
| `TZ` | sx_systemprompt.c | LOW | Timezone |
| `TERM` | scorpiox-unshare.c | LOW | Terminal type |
| `PATH` | sx_platform.c, scorpiox-unshare.c | LOW | Executable search path |
| `IMAGE_BASE_URL` | scorpiox-wsl.c, scorpiox-unshare.c | LOW | Container image source |
| `SXMUX_INIT_CMD` | sxmux_pane.c | LOW | Initial mux command |

### 9.2 Environment Variable Injection

- `scorpiox-agent.c` reads environment variables from a file and calls `setenv()` for each — this could be used to inject arbitrary env vars into child processes
- Multiple providers call `setenv()` to pass API keys to child processes (e.g., `scorpiox-openai` binary)
- Git PAT tokens are injected into URLs: `https://PAT@host/path` — may appear in process listings

---

## 10. Risk Assessment

### 10.1 Critical Risks

| # | Risk | Severity | Location | Recommendation |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **C1** | Hardcoded API keys in WASM binary | **CRITICAL** | sx_config_embedded.c | Remove all secrets from compiled code; use runtime-only config or secure vault |
| **C2** | Hardcoded SSH password in WASM binary | **CRITICAL** | sx_config_embedded.c | `"xboxone"` — rotate immediately, remove from source |
| **C3** | Unsalted SHA-256 password hashing | **CRITICAL** | sxmail_auth.c:121 | Migrate to Argon2id or bcrypt with per-user salt |

### 10.2 High Risks

| # | Risk | Severity | Location | Recommendation |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **H1** | Plaintext API keys in config files | HIGH | sx_config.c, scorpiox-env.txt | Encrypt sensitive config values or use OS keychain |
| **H2** | Unfiltered env var logging | HIGH | scorpiox-agent.c:817 | Filter sensitive keys (API_KEY, PASS, SECRET, TOKEN) from log output |
| **H3** | Config snapshot may contain secrets | HIGH | sx_session.c | Redact sensitive keys in config-snapshot.txt |
| **H4** | Traffic capture stores full HTTP bodies | HIGH | scorpiox-traffic.c | Warn users; auto-redact Authorization headers |
| **H5** | No data-at-rest encryption | HIGH | All persistence | Encrypt conversation.json, session logs, and config at rest |
| **H6** | Conversation stores all tool outputs | HIGH | sx_conversation.c | Consider content filtering/redaction for sensitive outputs |

### 10.3 Medium Risks

| # | Risk | Severity | Location | Recommendation |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **M1** | Predictable temp file paths | MEDIUM | 8+ locations | Use `mkstemp()`/`mkdtemp()` instead of predictable names |
| **M2** | Fixed temp file paths (voice) | MEDIUM | scorpiox-voice.c | Race condition / symlink attack — use mkstemp() |
| **M3** | Git PAT in URL visible to `ps` | MEDIUM | scorpiox-agent.c, scorpiox-server.c | Use credential helper or git-credential-store |
| **M4** | No session retention enforcement | MEDIUM | sx_session.c | Implement automatic cleanup per SESSION_RETENTION_DAYS |
| **M5** | Config value logged on write | MEDIUM | sx_config.c:640 | Redact values for keys matching sensitive patterns |
| **M6** | Builtin script written to predictable /tmp path | MEDIUM | sx_slashcmd.c:567 | `/tmp/sx_builtin_<name>.sh` could be pre-planted — use mkstemp() |

### 10.4 Low Risks

| # | Risk | Severity | Location | Recommendation |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **L1** | Debug log reveals API key length | LOW | sx_provider_openai.c:426 | Minor info leak; consider removing |
| **L2** | Email log in fallback /tmp path | LOW | scorpiox-server-email.c:486 | Falls back to `/tmp` if HOME unset |
| **L3** | JWT claims logged at INFO | LOW | scorpiox-server.c:502 | user_id/email in logs — acceptable for audit |

---

## 11. Recommendations Summary

### Immediate Actions (Critical)
1. **Rotate all hardcoded credentials** in `sx_config_embedded.c` — they are compromised
2. **Remove secrets from compiled binaries** — use runtime configuration or encrypted config vault
3. **Replace SHA-256 password hashing** with Argon2id (preferred) or bcrypt with salt

### Short-term Actions (High)
4. Add sensitive-key filtering to all log output (match patterns: `*KEY*`, `*PASS*`, `*SECRET*`, `*TOKEN*`)
5. Redact sensitive values in config-snapshot.txt
6. Implement data-at-rest encryption for conversation and session data

### Medium-term Actions
7. Replace all predictable `/tmp/sx_*` paths with `mkstemp()`/`mkdtemp()`
8. Implement automatic session data cleanup per `SESSION_RETENTION_DAYS`
9. Add content filtering/redaction for tool outputs in conversation storage
10. Use OS keychain (macOS Keychain, Linux Secret Service) for API key storage

---

*Report generated by Security Audit Agent — 2026-04-28*